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Abstract
We report results from a sender-receiver cheap talk game, which explores whether an indi-
vidual's decision to deceive is inuenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group.
We show theoretically that positively biased senders, who think they are higher in the decep-
tion distribution than they actually are, will correct their beliefs and increase their cheating,
when presented with information on the actual deception distribution. Hence, a predominantly
positively biased group of senders will increase its average deception. Moreover, within a group,
being more positively biased implies cheating less. The experimental data conrm both of these
hypotheses.
Keywords: Deception, Lying, Sender-receiver game, Concern for Rank
JEL: C91, D03, D83
We thank Jiadi Yao for excellent research assistance. We are grateful to Mirco Tonin, Miltos Makris and seminar
participants at the University of Southampton, IMEBE 2013 and the 2013 Florence Workshop on Behavioral and
Experimental Economics for comments and suggestions. This research was funded by a British Academy Small
Research Grant, and by a Sta Research Development Grant from the University of Southampton. The paper was
partly written while Vlassopoulos was visiting the ALBA Graduate Business School, whose hospitality is gratefully
acknowledged.
yEconomics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK,
s.galanis@soton.ac.uk.
zEconomics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK,
m.vlassopoulos@soton.ac.uk.1 Introduction
The act of deceiving others in order to promote one's interests is both common and well docu-
mented. Some familiar examples are tax payers cheating on their tax returns, politicians lying
about their future actions in order to get elected, insurees lying about their characteristics so that
they obtain a better contract, job applicants lying about their qualications in order to get hired,
or salespeople lying about the quality of the product in order to secure a better deal. Standard
economic theory treats deception as the by-product of a cost-benet analysis that each agent per-
forms, given his preferences. For instance, in contract and mechanism design theory, agents have a
private information characteristic that they can lie about, if this will make them better o.
However, many other factors, unrelated to a direct own cost-benet analysis, may inuence the
decision to deceive. For instance, Gneezy (2005) shows that people do not only care about their
own gain from cheating but also take into account the losses that cheating may impose on others.
Recently, several experimental studies of deception have attempted to identify the determinants of
lying and to estimate individuals' intrinsic cost of lying (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2013; Gibson et al.,
2013).1
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to this literature, by examining whether
individuals have a cost of cheating that is a function of one's perception of his relative standing in
the cheating distribution of his peer group. In other words, we examine whether an individual's
decision to deceive is inuenced by how much he thinks his peers, who are closest to him in the
distribution, will cheat. This perspective has implications for cheating behavior when someone
receives information regarding the deceptive behavior of his peers that we test and conrm in an
experimental setting. Our most important nding is that a basic determinant of whether deception
will increase or decrease is whether subjects are positively or negatively biased, as measured by the
dierence between their actual and perceived decile in the distribution of deception. If a group is
positively biased then information will increase average cheating, whereas if it is negatively biased,
information will decrease average cheating.
The idea that many economic decisions (e.g. consumption, saving, labor supply, education,
charitable giving) are inuenced by concerns for relative standing compared to a reference group
of peers is an old one in economics (Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949), but is also one that has
received more recent attention and empirical support (Clark et al., 2008; Postlewaite, 2011a,b;
Heetz and Frank, 2011). In this paper we combine this literature with the literature that studies
the determinants of deception mentioned above: we consider whether a connection exists between
one's perceptions about the degree of cheating that prevails in the peer group and his own decision
to cheat. A relevant example is tax compliance. Assuming that the amount of tax evaded is
proportional to earned income, then a middle-class individual's decision to evade his taxes may be
more inuenced by his perception of how much other middle-class individuals cheat, rather than
how much the very rich or the very poor cheat.
However, inferring whether individuals have a concern for relative standing by looking at
whether their cheating responds to information about the deception of others is an exercise fraught
with identication problems, as information may also induce other types of learning. To explain
1See also Ellingsen et al. (2009), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012),
Abeler et al. (2012), Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013).
1more concretely, suppose that an individual has beliefs p which describe the uncertainty of his own
payo (e.g. probability of auditing in a tax evasion environment) and beliefs q about how much
his peers will cheat (e.g. amount of tax evasion among individuals with similar income). Hence,
he faces a trade o between maximizing his expected payo given p and incurring the psycholog-
ical cost of cheating more than his peers, according to his beliefs q. Having concern for relative
ranking means that information which changes q, will change deception. However, information
about how much others cheat may also change p. For example, information about tax evasion may
also update one's probability p of auditing, hence confounding the two eects. To overcome this
problem, we develop a more elaborate version of the sender-receiver cheap talk game that has been
used extensively in economics to study deception (Gneezy, 2005), with the added property that
information about cheating of others does not inuence p.2 We achieve this by having a more nely
gradated measure of deception (as opposed to the binary deception or no deception measure in
Gneezy (2005)), so that learning how much others have deceived cannot help you infer their beliefs
p.3
To address our research question we develop an experimental design consisting of two stages. In
the rst stage, the participants play a single-shot, cheap-talk, deception game. Player 1, the sender,
ranks six possible actions, each specifying a payo for him and player 2, the receiver. The payos
always sum to $10. He then sends a message to the receiver with a ranking of the actions. The
receiver, without knowing which action is associated with which payo, picks a number between 1
and 6, which determines the action and therefore the payos of both players. The message species
that the sender has ranked the actions according to the receiver's payo. Hence, the sender has
an incentive to deceive the receiver, in order to obtain a higher payo. We measure cheating by
the distance between the honest and the reported rankings, using a cheating score function, which
maps rankings into a number between 0-9. We communicate this measure to the senders only. In
the second stage, we elicit the beliefs of the senders regarding how their cheating ranks relative to
other senders in their group.
We consider our measure of deception to be plausible because it has the following two properties.
First, a higher deception score represents a larger departure from the honest ranking. Second, as
the deception score increases, one can always nd rankings with that score, which weakly increase
the sender's payo and therefore weakly decrease the receiver's payo, given the most plausible
beliefs of the senders regarding the behavior of the receivers.4 In other words, under these beliefs
our measure has the property that a higher score \cheats" the receiver more.
We dene biasedness as the dierence between actual and perceived (median) decile. We say
that a sender is positively biased if his actual decile is higher than his perceived (median) one. Such
2Other studies that have used an experimental setting similar to that of Gneezy (2005) to study deception are
Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007), Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Sutter (2009), Rode
(2010), and Innes and Mitra (2012).
3We are aware of two other ways of cancelling the eect of information on updating p. The rst is making p
objective, as in Gibson et al. (2013). The shortcoming with this approach for our purposes is that lying is costly for
the experimenter and not another subject, and this may aect the decision to lie. The second is the method suggested
by Gneezy et al. (2013), where deception may harm another subject, but the extent of deception does not translate
into a lower payo for the receiver. So in terms of payo consequences to the receiver, the sender's deception action
is binary, whereas for our purposes we need to have a more nely gradated measure of deception.
4As in Gneezy (2005), we nd that the position chosen more often by the receivers is the rst one. In other words,
they follow the recommendation of the sender.
2a sender has underestimated the cheating of others, thinking that his score puts him in the top
(e.g. decile 3), whereas in reality he is in the bottom (e.g. decile 8). If relative standing matters to
him, then due to his wrong beliefs he has incurred a higher psychological cost. Hence, if we provide
information that reveals to him that his initial score puts him at decile 8, then the cost he incurs
drops and he re-optimizes by increasing his score.5 A similar argument suggests that a negatively
biased sender would decrease his score when presented with information about the distribution
of scores. Therefore, for a group that is predominantly positively biased, providing information
about the distribution of scores leads to a higher average score. Using a similar reasoning we can
argue that, within the same group, being more negatively biased implies incurring a lower cost and
therefore a higher cheating score. We formalize these hypotheses in section 2.3.
The experimental data conrm these two hypotheses. We nd that the control group is pre-
dominantly positively biased and that the average score in the treatment group is 11% higher, a
statistically signicant dierence. Moreover, we nd that negatively biased senders have a higher
average score than the positively biased ones. Finally, it is not the case that subjects react to any
type of information, or that they blindly imitate the behavior of subjects in the reference group. In
particular, when we only release information about the average deception score or about the scores
of the highest and lowest deciles, we nd no statistically signicant dierence in average cheating.6
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the experimental setting and we
formalize our hypotheses. In section 3 we present our results and in section 4 we conclude.
2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of two stages. In the rst stage participants play a single-shot, cheap-
talk, deception game in which senders transmit a message to receivers, who then take an action
which determines the payos of both players. In this setting the sender may be tempted to deceive
the receiver in order to ensure a higher own payo. In the second stage we elicit senders' beliefs
regarding how their cheating in the sender-receiver game ranks relative to other subjects.
2.1 The Sender-Receiver Deception Game
The experiment consists of two stages. In the rst stage, there are two players, a sender and a
receiver, and each participant is randomly and anonymously assigned one of the two roles. There
are 6 outcomes, A = fa1;:::;a6g, that the receiver can choose from, and each outcome species an
allocation of $10 among the two players. The payos associated with each of the 6 outcomes are
(0,10), (2,8), (4,6), (6,4), (8,2) and (10,0), where the rst number species the sender's payo and
the second number species the receiver's payo, in GBP. Therefore, there is a clear ranking of the
6 outcomes for the sender if own monetary payo is the only relevant dimension he cares about,
whereas the ranking for a receiver who is only concerned about own payo is the exact reverse.
5A crucial step in this argument is that information about the cheating distribution does not alter his beliefs p
about what the receiver will do, only his beliefs q about the cheating of other senders. We elaborate on this argument
in section 2.3, where we formally explain our theory.
6In a tax evasion experiment with objective probability of auditing, Fortin et al. (2007) also nd that mean group
behavior has no impact on tax evasion decision under self-consistent expectations.
3The sender's ranking is communicated to the receiver through an onscreen message, displayed
below in Figure 1. Eectively, the sender's message is a ranking of the monetary payos, made by
the sender from the perspective of the receiver.
Figure 1: Screenshot of Message from Sender to Receiver
Note that the outcomes are dened such that the incentives of the sender are not aligned
with those of the receiver, which means that the sender has an incentive to deceive the receiver.
However, the receiver does not know this as he is never informed about the payos associated
with each outcome. Although he is told that the sender has specied a ranking of the outcomes
according to the receiver's interests, he has no way of knowing what are the available payos for
him or for the sender. Therefore, he has no way of knowing whether his interests oppose those of
the sender, or not, and the sender is also aware of this. The only payo he learns is the one he
receives after he makes his choice, without being informed about the sender's payo.
To capture the level of deception associated with each ranking of the outcomes, we specify a
score function that calculates the dierence between the true ranking according to the receiver's
payo and any other ranking. We communicate this to the sender but not to the receiver. The
score is calculated as follows: for each action a 2 A, let t(a) 2 f1;2;:::6g be the true ranking of a
from the perspective of the receiver. Let r(a) be the reported ranking of a from the perspective of
the receiver. We dene the deception score of report r to be
s(r) =
1
2
X
a2A
jr(a)   t(a)j:
The honest report has a score of 0, whereas the highest deception can be achieved by reporting the
sender's ranking, instead of the receiver's, which yields a score of 1=2  (5 + 5 + 3 + 3 + 1 + 1) = 9.
The possible scores are all integers between 0 and 9. Note that if report r has a higher score
than report r0, then r is further away from the true report than r0 is, according to this metric.
4This is because the sum of the absolute dierences between the true and reported rankings for
each action is higher under r than under r0. Hence, we provide senders with a set of available
strategies (the reports) and a score function, which is a way of ranking these strategies in terms of
how deceitful they are.
To facilitate computation and allow subjects to familiarize themselves with how rankings of the
outcomes map into deception scores we supply senders with a calculator that can compute, for each
reported ranking that the subject may enter, the associated deception score and we allow subjects
to experiment by entering dierent rankings before submitting their nal choice. Moreover, to
ensure that subjects have understood how the deception score is computed we ask senders several
comprehension questions, before we allow them to proceed to submitting their nal choice.
Finally, we communicate the sender's message to the receiver (without revealing the payos)
and ask him to choose an outcome, that will determine the payo for both agents for this stage of
the experiment. Since we are interested in the behavior of senders, to economize on the number
of subjects, each receiver made a single choice, which was used to determine the payo of multiple
senders. We randomly chose one of these senders to determine the payo of each receiver. Hence,
both sender and receiver play a single-shot game and this is common knowledge.
2.2 Eliciting Perceptions of Relative Deception
In the second stage, only applicable to senders, we ask subjects a series of incentivized questions
aiming to reveal their perceptions as to how deceptively they have acted relative to other subjects.
In particular, we ask participants a series of choices between a bet on their relative standing in
terms of their deception score and a lottery of the type displayed below in Figure 2. These questions
allow us to deduce in which of the 10 deciles of the distribution of scores (top 10%, between 10%
and 20%, ..., bottom 10%) each participant places his median belief.7 Our approach of eliciting
subjects' beliefs of their relative standing follows an incentive compatible mechanism suggested in
the recent overcondence literature (e.g. Beno^ t and Dubra, 2011).8 We told participants that one
of questions would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine their payo for
this stage of the experiment.
2.3 Hypotheses
In order to formalize our hypotheses, we build a simple model where concern about one's relative
standing inuences the chosen score. Let A be the set of actions, with typical element a 2 A. Let
R be the set of rankings that the sender can choose from, with typical element r 2 R. A ranking
r 2 R is a function that maps each action a 2 A to a number between 1 and 6. The receiver picks
a position between 1 and 6, without knowing which action corresponds to which position. Each
action a 2 A species a payo for both the sender and the receiver. For example, if the sender
picks ranking r and the receiver picks position 3, then the payos are determined by action a such
7We deduce the exact decile for subjects who place themselves at the tails (deciles 1-3 and 7-10). The residual
category is for subjects who place themselves in the middle deciles 4-7.
8We also asked participants what probability they assign on being in the top 10% and being in the bottom 10%
of the distribution using a series of similar choices between a bet and a lottery.
5Figure 2: Screenshot of Second Stage Question Eliciting Perceptions of Relative Deception
that r(a) = 3. Let ui : A ! R be sender i's instantaneous utility from action a. Note that we
do not make the assumption that the sender's instantaneous utility is necessarily monotonic with
respect to his own payo.
We postulate that sender i's utility function, Ui, has two components. The rst is a function
of his chosen ranking, r, and of his probabilistic beliefs about which position the receiver will
pick. Beliefs are modelled by having a probability distribution over the set of all positions, p 2
f1;:::;6g, where K denotes the set of all probability distributions over a set K. We write this
rst component as
P
a2A
p(r(a))ui(a).
The second component depends on the sender's perceived relative standing. As explained in
section 2.1, each ranking r generates a score s(r). If we order the scores by all senders in the
reference group, from highest to lowest (breaking ties by randomizing), we can create 10 deciles,
where decile 1 contains the scores that are in the top 10% of the distribution, decile 2 contains the
scores that are between the top 20% and top 10% of the distribution, and so on. Hence, the scores
in decile 1 are those exhibiting the highest cheating, whereas those in decile 10 exhibit the lowest
cheating, relative to the reference group.
Let D = f1;:::;10g be the set of all deciles. We postulate that each sender i incurs an
instantaneous cost Ci : D ! R by choosing a score that places him in decile d 2 D. As d increases
(hence moving closer to the \low cheating" decile 10), cost decreases. We allow senders to have
dierent cost functions Ci, so that some care more about being closer to the low cheating decile 10
than others.
The sender does not know the scores of the other senders when choosing a ranking r, which
generates score s(r). He therefore has probabilistic beliefs over the set of all deciles. To simplify
the model, we assume that the sender cares only about his median belief decile, di
m(s(r)), which is
the decile d 2 D, such that he assigns at least 50% probability that his actual decile is at least d
and at least 50% probability that his actual decile is at most d, if he chooses score s(r). A higher
score, holding the scores of the other senders constant, implies a lower (i.e. closer to 1) median
decile. Hence, di
m is a decreasing function of score. Summarizing, sender i's utility function is the
6following:
Ui(r;p) =
X
a2A
p(r(a))ui(a)   Ci(di
m(s(r))):
The sender chooses a ranking r that maximises Ui, given his beliefs p about what the receiver
will do and his median beliefs function, di
m, about what the other senders will do. Let R(s) = fr 2
R : s(r) = sg be the set of rankings that achieve a score of s. We can rewrite Ui as a function of
the score s and beliefs p: Ui(s;p) = V i(s;p)   Ci(s), where V i(s;p) = max
r2R(s)
P
a2A
p(r(a))ui(a). That
is, for each score, which determines i's cost, the sender picks ranking r that maximizes the value
of the rst component, among all rankings generating the same score.9 For ease of exposition, we
assume that V i and Ci are dened on the compact interval of scores [0;9]. The two components of
Ui(s;p) are depicted in Figure 3, for xed p.
Note that Ci depends on i's beliefs q about what the other senders will choose and on the
intrinsic cost of being on decile d. We separate these two components by postulating the following
functional form: Ci(s) = aiCi
0(s), where ai > 0 and Ci
0(s) represents the intrinsic cost, with
Ci
0(0) = 0 and
@Ci
0
@s  0.
It is worthwhile to note that we do not make any assumptions about the relationship between
V i and score. In that way, we can accommodate many dierent types of senders. For instance, a
sender who thinks that the receiver will trust him, so that he believes that it is more probable that
the receiver will choose position x over x + 1, for each x = 1;:::;5, can be modelled by having an
increasing V i with respect to s. This is because higher scores can be generated by rankings that
place the high sender's payos to the low positions, such as x = 1;2;3. Alternatively, a sender
who thinks that the receiver does not trust him, so that he believes that it is more probable that
the receiver will choose x + 1 over x, can be modelled by a decreasing V i with respect to s. More
general beliefs p can be depicted by a non-monotonic V i, as in Figure 3.
The general form of V i also allows for senders who care about types of deceptions dierent than
the one we propose. For example, consider a sender who believes with probability one that the
receiver will pick the action he ranked in position 6 and thinks that rankings which dier only with
respect to positions 1 to 5 are equally deceptive, as they \hurt" the receiver equally. Such a sender
is indierent (according to the rst component) between two rankings that assign the same action
to position 6, and therefore V i(s;p) depends only on what rankings r 2 R(s) specify in position 6.
In the experiment we extract di
m(s) using an incentivised method. We also compute the sender's
actual decile, di
a(s). We say that sender i is positively biased if he has chosen a ranking that generates
score s and di
a(s) di
m(s) > 0, negatively biased if di
a(s) di
m(s) < 0 and unbiased if di
a(s) di
m(s) = 0.
A positively biased sender has overestimated his relative position, thinking that his chosen score
places him higher in the distribution (e.g. decile 3), than in reality (e.g. decile 8).
Suppose that all senders in a reference group are presented with the actual distribution of scores
of another, similar group of senders. This information can be used by each sender as a signal, in
9V
i is well dened if R is nite and, more generally, if R(s) is compact for all s and
P
a2A
p(r(a))u
i(a) is continuous
in R.
7    Score
V
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Figure 3: Optimal Score
order to update his median beliefs about the mapping between scores and deciles. Recall that the
sender cares about his relative standing with respect to members of his own reference group, who
receive the same information as him. Therefore, when forming his median beliefs about the mapping
between scores and deciles, he also needs to incorporate the response to the same information of
the other senders in his own reference group.
Suppose that sender i is positively biased and his chosen score is s (Figure 3). After receiving
the information about another reference group, he realizes that he has overestimated his relative
position. For example, if he thought that s placed him in decile 4, now he realizes that it places
him in decile 7. In order to update his beliefs, the parameter of biasedness decreases to ai
1, resulting
in a downward rotation of the Ci function. Let Ci
1 be the new cost function. Moreover, hi(s) =
Ci(s) Ci
1(s) = (ai ai
1)Ci
0(s) is an increasing function of s. Because V i is unchanged, this implies
that sender i will weakly increase his score.10 A similar argument shows that if the sender is
negatively biased, he will weakly decrease his score.
The change in score described above does not take into account that other senders will also
change their score, after receiving the same information. If sender i can formulate second order
beliefs, he will realize that each positively biased sender will weakly increase his score, whereas
each negatively biased sender will weakly decrease his score. If sender i believes that the positively
biased senders are more than the negatively biased ones (as we nd in the control group), then
ai
1 will decrease further, implying that the cost function will rotate downwards again and i will
choose an even higher score. Increasingly sophisticated senders can compute higher order beliefs.
We reach an equilibrium if all agents are unbiased when presented with the distribution of scores
of all other senders.
If the senders are not sophisticated enough, they will not be able to compute their higher order
beliefs, and as a result an equilibrium may not be reached. In fact, as shown by Nagel (1995) and
other papers, subjects usually cannot compute higher than third order beliefs, so we expect that
10Recall that at s
 we have the highest dierence between V
i and C
i. Because the dierence between C
i and C
i
1
is increasing with s, it must be that the highest dierence between V
i and C
i
1 must be at s

1  s
.
8in an experimental setting, not all senders will be unbiased after receiving the same information.
We assume that the ability to compute higher order beliefs and therefore to correctly change one's
score is independent of whether a sender is positively or negatively biased.
In the argument above we implicitly assume that information about the scores does not change
the beliefs p or the functional form V i(s;p). Hence, the rst component of Ui does not change.
There are two reasons why we make such an assumption. The rst is that the senders choose their
score before learning the response of the receivers, and they only play the game once. Hence, the
score distribution of other senders does not convey any information about how to better play the
game.
The second reason is that even if a sender wanted to use the distribution of scores in order to
extract the beliefs of the other senders and update his own beliefs, this is almost impossible. The
reason is that each score corresponds to many rankings, consistent with very diverse beliefs p. For
example, a score of 5 or 6 can be generated by rankings which are optimal for a self-interested
sender who does not care about his relative position and attaches probability 1 to the receiver
picking position x, where x = 1;:::;6. That is, degenerate beliefs about all possible positions are
consistent with a score of 5 or 6. A score of 7 is consistent with position x = 1;:::;5, a score of
8 is consistent with position x = 1;:::;4, and so on. If we allow for mixed beliefs, risk aversion
or concern for relative standing, then each belief p is consistent with many more scores. Hence,
knowing someone's score cannot help discovering his beliefs p.
This can be contrasted with the setting of Gneezy (2005), where knowing a sender's action
(lie or not lie) with the above characteristics implies knowing his beliefs p. That is, providing
information about the behavior of other senders may transmit information about what their beliefs
are, and hence inuence the sender's decision, even if he does not care of the deception of others.
In the current setting this way of transmitting information about beliefs is excluded.
We say that a group of senders is positively biased if the majority of senders are positively biased
and the average absolute value of biasedness is the same across the negative and the positively biased
senders.11 The denition of a negatively biased group is similar. We treat positively and negatively
biased senders symmetrically. In particular, we assume that two senders who are identical in
everything except that one is positively and the other is negatively biased (but the absolute value
of their biasedness is the same) will correct their score by the same amount in absolute values. We
are now ready to formulate our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Suppose that we present the distribution of scores of a group of senders to another
group whose members have not made their choice yet. If the group is positively biased, then average
cheating will increase, when compared to an otherwise identical group, where this information is
not presented. If the group is negatively biased, then average cheating will decrease.
For our next hypothesis, we assume that the dierence between actual and perceived decile is
monotonic in score. That is, if s > s0 then di
a(s) di
m(s)  di
a(s0) di
m(s0). We say that sender i is
more positively biased than sender j if i has chosen a ranking with score si, j has chosen a ranking
with score sj and di
a(si)   di
m(si) > d
j
a(sj)   d
j
m(sj).
Suppose that two senders have the same beliefs p, instantaneous utility u and intrinsic cost
11This is in fact what we nd in the experimental data reported below.
9of being in a decile, C0, but i is more positively biased than j. We will show that si  sj.
Suppose by contradiction that si > sj. Because the dierence between actual and perceived decile
is monotonic in score, we have di
a(sj) di
m(sj)  di
a(si) di
m(si), which implies that di
a(sj) di
m(sj) >
d
j
a(sj) d
j
m(sj). Ignoring tie breakings, having the same score will generate the same actual decile,
hence di
a(sj) = d
j
a(sj).12 This implies that di
m(sj) < d
j
m(sj), therefore ai > aj, as i overestimates
the decile generated by score sj, relative to j. But this means that Ci is obtained by rotating Cj
to the left and, using the same argument as in Hypothesis 1, we have si  sj, a contradiction.
Therefore, if i is more positively biased than j then si  sj. We formulate our hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 2. Being more positively biased implies a lower score. Moreover, positively biased
senders have a lower average score than negatively biased senders.
2.4 Treatments
In addition to the control, our experimental design involves three treatments. In all treatments,
subjects play the same sender-receiver game, with the only dierence that we show some extra
information to the senders, before they submit their ranking of the actions. Moreover, we tell them
that we have communicated this information to all other senders taking part in this treatment.
Therefore, this information is common knowledge.
In the rst treatment, which we refer to as the score treatment, we show them the distribution
of the scores from the control group. In particular, we tell subjects what proportion of the control
group chose a score of 0, what proportion chose a score of 1 and so on. In a second treatment, that
we refer to as the mean treatment, we only show them the mean of the distribution of scores of
the control group. Finally, in the third treatment that we term tails treatment, we show them the
percentage of participants choosing score 0 and the percentage of participants choosing score 9, in
the control group. The aim of these last two treatments is to decompose the information about the
distribution of cheating score, in order to understand which pieces of information are more relevant
to the subjects.
2.5 Procedures
The experiment was conducted online with University of Southampton students in the fall of 2012
and winter of 2013. Participants were recruited through email announcements. Participants who
expressed interest in the experiment received login information (username, password and url). All
further experimental instructions, to be found in the appendix, were provided to participants upon
login into the experimental website. The experiment lasted 20-25 minutes and participants were
paid a participation fee of $3 and had the opportunity to earn additional money. Total average
payment was $9.25. Payments were carried out in cash by a research assistant.
A total of 432 participants (403 senders and 29 receivers) of diverse academic backgrounds
participated,13 with the sample being balanced in the gender dimension (51% males and 49%
12Note that in this general model we have assumed a compact interval of scores [0;9], so the probability of two
agents have exactly the same score is zero.
1334% study Economics or Management.
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Figure 4: Probability Distribution Function
females). The distribution of participants across treatments is as follows: 105 in the control, 100
in the score treatment, 99 in the mean treatment and 99 in the tails treatment.
3 Results
3.1 Main Results
We begin the presentation of our experimental results by discussing the behavior of senders in the
rst stage of the experiment. Figure 4 illustrates the probability distribution of the deception score
separately for the control and the score treatment. We nd that in the control condition the highest
score (9) is the most popular choice as it is chosen by roughly 20% of subjects. Each of the numbers
between 5 and 8 are chosen by at least 10% of subjects, while it is perhaps remarkable that almost
7% of subjects chose the truthful ranking which yields a score of 0.14 When we turn attention to
the score treatment, we see a noticeable shift of weight toward the highest scores 8 and 9 which
combined are now chosen by almost half of the subjects (as opposed to 30% in the control).
We next consider the degree of biasedness of the senders. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Recall from section 2.3 that we dene a sender's bias to be the dierence between the actual decile
of the chosen score and the perceived decile, which we deduce in stage 2 of the experiment.15 Note
14Almost 70% of receivers chose an action ranked in top 3 by a sender. In particular, 34.5% chose the highest
ranked action, 24.1% the second highest, 10.3% the third highest, 17.2% the fourth highest, 3.5% the fth and nally
10.3% the sixth highest.
15In order to determine the actual deciles, we ranked all senders according to their score, breaking ties by random-
11that as we do not deduce where exactly in deciles 4-7 a subject belongs to we apply the following
assignment protocol for subjects whose perceived decile is between 4 and 7: we assign zero bias if
their actual decile also lies in the interval 4-7; when the actual decile is less than 4 we assign the
dierence between actual and 4; when the actual is greater than 7 we assign the dierence between
actual and 7.16
As can be seen in Table 1 for the control group, there are more positively than negatively
biased subjects. In particular, 46 subjects (43.8%) are positively biased, whereas 33 are negatively
biased (31.4%). The average bias, across all subjects in the control group, is 0.2. Moreover, in
absolute value the biasedness of the positively biased is statistically indistinguishable from those
that are negatively biased (Mann-Whitney two-sided test; p-value=0.26). Therefore, according to
our theory, the control group ts the denition of a positively biased group.
Control Score Treatment
Freq. Percent Mean Score Freq. Percent Mean Score
Negatively Biased 33 31.4 7.5 25 25 8.3
Unbiased 26 24.8 5.9 23 23 5.9
Positively Biased 46 43.8 4.8 52 52 6.1
All 105 5.9 100 6.6
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Bias and Deception Score
We are now ready to examine whether Hypothesis 1 holds. According to it we expect that
since the control is positively biased the average score in the score treatment will be higher than
in the control group. A Mann-Whitney test indicates signicant dierence in the distribution of
scores between the control and the score treatment (p=0.024, two-sided test). This is conrmed
by regression analysis reported in Table 2. In particular, in columns (1) and (2) we report OLS
regressions of the deception score on a dummy for being in the score treatment with and without
a control for gender. We nd that the mean deception score in the control group is 5.94, whereas
in the score treatment the mean deception score is signicantly higher by 11%. Columns (4) and
(5) report OLS regressions of the probability of selecting a score greater than 6. These regressions
also indicate that subjects in the score treatment are more likely to choose a deception score that
is higher than 6.
izing. We then assigned decile 1 to the top 10%, and similarly for the rest.
16We also tried an alternative assignment protocol, whereby we assigned the midpoint 5.5 to those whose perceived
decile is between 4 and 7. We then took dierences between their actual decile and 5.5. This protocol produces a
more positive bias.
12Deception Score Score  6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 5:943 5:656 6:014 0:61 0:576
(0.24) (0.30) (0.21) (0.05) (0.05)
Score 0:637 0:686 0:711 0:12 0:126
(0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.065) (0.045)
Female 0:579 0:067
(0.36) (0.065)
Bias  0:354
(0.03)
Obs. 205
Notes: , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2: OLS regressions.
The dierence can also be seen in Figure 5 which shows that the cumulative distribution function
of the score treatment rst order stochastically dominates that of the control.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Score
c.d.f. of  Control  c.d.f. of  Treatment Score 
Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Function
We next examine whether Hypothesis 2 holds in our data. A rst conrmation of this hypothesis
13is provided in column (3) of Table 2, which indicates that there is a negative and signicant
association between the deception score chosen and the \size" of a subject's bias. This can be
further seen by comparing the distribution of scores of positively biased subjects to that of negatively
biased (averages are displayed in Table 1). A Mann-Whitney test strongly rejects equality for both
the control and score treatment.
3.2 Additional Results
In this subsection we present some results from the two auxiliary treatments mean and tails. In
Table 3 we present regressions of score in columns (1) and (2) and of the probability of selecting a
score greater than 6. In all cases, we see no evidence of an eect of having seen the mean score or
the tails of the score distribution of the control. This is corroborated by a Mann-Whitney test (p-
value=0.11 and 0.71, respectively, for pairwise comparison between control and mean and control
and tails treatment).
Deception Score Score  6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 5:943 5:869 0:61 0:624
(0.24) (0.28) (0.05) (0.06)
Mean 0:491 0:480 0:087 0:085
(0.34) (0.35) (0.07) (0.07)
Tails 0.047 0:040 0.047 0:049
(0.36) (0.36) (0.07) (0.07)
Female 0:149  0:030
(0.29) (0.06)
Obs. 303
Notes: , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3: OLS regressions: Treatments Mean and Tails.
It is important to note that these auxiliary results are consistent with our theory of concern for
relative standing inuencing deception. Observing the mean of the control distribution does not
alter one's perception of his relative standing. Hence, we do not expect that the mean deception
score of those in the mean treatment will be dierent from that of the control. The same is true
if one observes the percentage of participants choosing score 0 or score 9. This information can
be used to calculate the score of those in the top decile 1 and in the bottom decile 10. However,
if a subject's median decile is not one of these two deciles, then this information will not change
his perception and therefore his score will stay the same. Therefore, on the aggregate, we should
14not expect a signicant dierence in the average mean score of those in the tails treatment and the
control.
3.3 Discussion
In this section, we make three points regarding our experimental ndings. First, the fact that there
are dierences in deception when subjects receive information regarding the whole distribution as
opposed to only the average or the tails suggests that we do not just nd that informing people
that there is more deception than they thought leads them to deceive more. The experimental
results indicate that what matters is information regarding their relative deception, which is only
revealed in the score treatment.
Second, a few recent experimental studies in economics and social psychology (Innes and Mitra,
2012; Gino et al., 2009; Fosgaard et al., 2013) have demonstrated that exposure to other people's
deception can inuence one's own deceptive behavior, due to concerns for social conformity (Cialdini
and Goldstein, 2004; Ayal and Gino, 2011). Our evidence also suggests that social conformity is
present. Our contribution is to illustrate the relevance of a specic type of social conformity. In
particular, our mechanism suggests that each subject conforms to the cheating exhibited by the
peers closest to him in the distribution, and not necessarily to the prevalent behavior in the group.
In other words, social conformity occurs with respect to a sub-group, dened by one's preferred
position in the deception distribution.
Finally, as discussed in the introduction and in section 2.3, providing information about the
cheating of others may not only change one's perception of his relative standing, but also update
his beliefs p about other parameters of the game. In that case, change in the cheating behavior
cannot be solely attributed to a concern for relative standing, as the two eects are confounded.
For example, information about the deception scores of others may reveal what are their beliefs
regarding what the receivers will do, which could be used by the senders of the treatment group
in order to update their own beliefs. We believe this is unlikely to be driving behavior in our
experiment for two reasons. First, the senders of the control group play the game only once and we
record their cheating score before they learn their payo. Hence, their choice is not the outcome of
experience play. Second, we specically designed the game in a way such that each cheating score
is associated with many dierent rankings of the possible distributions of the $10. Therefore, each
score is consistent with many dierent beliefs of the sender about what the receiver will do. This
means that receiving information about the cheating score of a sender does not reveal what his
beliefs are about what the receiver will do.17 This is to be contrasted with the setting in Gneezy
(2005) and subsequent papers, where there are only two actions (cheat or no cheat), so providing
information about the choice of a sender can reveal what his beliefs are as well.
4 Conclusion
We postulate that individuals have a cost of lying that is a function of their relative standing in
the deception distribution of their peer group. We conrm such a relationship between deception
17We elaborated on this argument in section 2.3.
15and relative standing experimentally. In particular, we postulate that a basic determinant of
whether deception will increase or decrease is whether subjects are positively or negatively biased,
as measured by the dierence between their actual and perceived decile in the distribution of
deception. Our theory suggests that being positively biased means overestimating the cost of
deception. Therefore, receiving information that corrects this overestimation will lead to more
cheating. Alternatively, ceteris paribus, being more positively biased means that you cheat less.
We conrm both of these hypotheses. Indeed, when we released information to a positively biased
treatment group about the deception scores of the control group, this led to a signicant increase in
cheating. Moreover, we found that, within a group, being more positively biased implied cheating
less.
An area where our ndings may have interesting policy implications is tax compliance. For
instance, according to Leicester et al. (2012), in the UK, the gap between collected tax revenues
and those that were due based on tax law was almost 8 per cent, or around $35 billion, in 2009-
10. In other countries the tax gap can be higher. Leicester et al. (2012) cites several behavioral
elements that are relevant for tax compliance, like overestimation of the likelihood of detection,
tax complexity, or social factors, such as information about whether others pay their taxes. The
message of this paper is that information about tax compliance of others can either increase or
decrease tax compliance, depending on whether the target group is positively or negatively biased.
Therefore, before releasing such information, one should rst estimate the biasedness of the group.
Finally, having established that biased beliefs about one's relative standing inuences cheating,
an interesting question that arises is how to model the formation of biased beliefs and, more
importantly, how these beliefs are updated with the arrival of new information. Since all peers in
the group will change their beliefs and their actions in response to the new information, a proper
model has to take into account how higher order beliefs are formulated. We leave these questions
for future research.
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18Appendix
Experimental Instructions for Senders
Screen 1: Log in
Screen 2: General Information
You are taking part in an economics experiment, the purpose of which is to examine the
decisions people make in certain circumstances. You will be paid a participation fee of $3
for completing the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to earn additional money.
The experiment will consist of two stages and will last about 20-25 minutes. In the rst
stage we will ask you to make a certain decision. Your earning for this stage will depend
on your decision and the decision of another participant. In the second stage we will ask
you some questions regarding the decision you made in the rst stage. Further details and
instructions will be provided at the beginning of each stage.
The money that you earn will be paid to you in cash. In particular, after all participants
have completed the experiment you will receive an email from us with instructions regarding
the specic times and the location at Higheld Campus to pick up your money from. Note
that an assistant will pay you privately.
Screen 3: Consent Form
Screen 4: Instructions for Stage 1
In this stage of the experiment, you are randomly matched with another participant. You
will be called player A and the participant you are matched with will be called player B.
The roles have been randomly allocated. You will not know with whom you were matched,
neither now nor after the experiment, and we will not reveal your identity to the participant
you are matched with either.
There are 6 outcomes. Each outcome consists of two numbers. The rst number indicates
a payo in pounds for player A and the second number indicates a payo in pounds for player
B. These 6 outcomes are as follows:
Player A Player B
0 10
2 8
4 6
6 4
8 2
10 0
We will ask you to rank these outcomes from 1 to 6. Then, player B will choose a number
from 1 to 6, without knowing what the outcomes are. Player B's choice will determine your
payments. For example, if you rank outcome (4,6) in position 3 and player B chooses number
193, then you will get $4 and he or she will get $6. If you rank outcome (6,4) in position 4
and player B chooses number 4, then you will get $6 and he or she will get $4.
Before making a choice, player B will receive a message from you, saying that you have
ranked the outcomes, from highest to lowest, according to player B's payo.
Please click below to see what the message will look like.
Screen 5: Message to Player B
Player A has ranked the 6 outcomes, in terms of your payo, from highest to lowest.
Please choose a number between 1 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
highest according to your payo) and 6 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
lowest according to your payo).
Screen 6: Instructions for Stage 1
Note that in the message, player B is told that you have ranked the outcomes, from
highest to lowest, according to player B's payo. However, the message does not display the
payos associated with each of the 6 outcomes. Therefore, player B can never know whether
your ranking is the true one or not.
If you want to see the message sent to player B again, click here.
Screen 7: Payment for Stage 1
Recall that the choice made by player B will determine the payments that you and player
B will receive in this stage of the experiment. For example, if you rank outcome (4,6) in
position 3 and player B chooses number 3, then you will get $4 and he or she will get $6. If
you rank outcome (6,4) in position 4 and player B chooses number 4, then you will get $6
and he or she will get $4. To repeat, when player B is making a choice he or she cannot see
any of the payos.
If you want to see the message sent to player B again, click here.
Screen 8: Score
We have constructed a formula that calculates the dierence between the true ranking
according to player B's payo and any other ranking. In what follows we explain how this
formula works.
First, note that the true ranking of outcomes according to player B's payo is the follow-
ing:
20Player A Player B True Ranking
0 10 1
2 8 2
4 6 3
6 4 4
8 2 5
10 0 6
The score for reporting this ranking is 0. Any other ranking places some of the outcomes
at a position that does not correspond to their true rank according to player B's payo. For
example, the true rank of outcome (10,0) is 6. If the reported rank of (10,0) is 1, then the
absolute dierence between true and reported rank is 5. For another example, the true rank
of outcome (2,8) is 2. If the reported rank of (2,8) is 4, then the absolute dierence between
true and reported rank is 2.
The score is calculated by adding the absolute dierence between true and reported rank,
for all six outcomes, and then dividing by 2.
Below is an example, which shows how to calculate the score for the following hypothetical
ranking.
Player A Player B True Ranking Hypothetical Ranking Absolute Dierence
0 10 1 2 j1   2j = 1
2 8 2 6 j2   6j = 4
4 6 3 5 j3   5j = 2
6 4 4 4 j4   4j = 0
8 2 5 1 j5   1j = 4
10 0 6 3 j6   3j = 3
Total 14
Score 14/2 = 7
Each possible ranking is associated with one of 10 possible scores: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and
9. The higher is the score, the larger is the deviation of the reported ranking from the true
one.
Screen 9: Quiz
To ensure that you understand the setup we would like you to answer some questions
regarding the following hypothetical scenario. If you want to read again the instructions
regarding how the score is calculated please click here.
Suppose that a hypothetical player A has ranked the outcomes in the following way:
21Player A Player B True Ranking Hypothetical Ranking
0 10 1 3
2 8 2 4
4 6 3 1
6 4 4 2
8 2 5 5
10 0 6 6
Then the matched hypothetical player B will receive the following message:
\Player A has ranked the 6 outcomes, in terms of your payo, from highest to lowest.
Please choose a number between 1 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
highest according to your payo) and 6 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
lowest according to your payo)."
Please answer the following questions:
1. What is the score of the ranking reported by player A?
2. Suppose that player B chooses option 2 in the screen. What is the payment that player
A will receive?
3. Suppose that player B chooses option 5 in the screen. What is the payment that player
B will receive?
Screen shown only to Score Treatment
We have previously run this experiment with a group of 106 student participants from
the University of Southampton. Before we ask you to provide your ranking we present below
some information regarding the scores chosen by this group of participants.
In particular, the table below presents the following piece of information. For each of the
10 possible scores, we report the percentage of participants who have chosen this particular
score.
Screen 10: Choice
Please select your ranking by inserting a number from 1 to 6 next to each outcome. Your
ranking and Player B's choice will determine your payment in this stage of the experiment.
Note that player B will have no information about the available outcomes and the asso-
ciated payos. Therefore, player B can never know whether the ranking you supply is the
true one or not.
Before submitting your ranking you should calculate the associated score by clicking the
button (Calculate score) below. You can try dierent rankings and calculate the associated
scores, but note that after you click on submit you will not be able to change your ranking.
22Recall that a higher score indicates a larger departure from the true ranking according
to player B's payo.
Screen 11: Instructions for Stage 2 for Control
Recall that the score associated with your reported ranking is XX, and any ranking can
obtain one of the 9 possible scores: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9, where a higher score indicates a
larger departure from the true ranking. If you want to read again the instructions regarding
how the score is calculated please click here.
We now ask you to answer a set of questions regarding your belief on how your score
compares to the score of other participants.
At the end we will randomly choose one of the questions and use your answer to that
question to determine your payment for this stage of the experiment.
Screen 11: Instructions for Stage 2 for Score Treatment
Recall that the score associated with your reported ranking is XX, and any ranking can
obtain one of the 9 possible scores: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9, where a higher score indicates a
larger departure from the true ranking.18 If you want to read again the instructions regarding
how the score is calculated please click here.
The information presented earlier refers to the scores submitted by a previous group of
participants. You belong to a new group of participants, and every member of your group
has received the same information about the previous group as you.
We now ask you to answer a set of questions regarding your belief on how your score
compares to the score of the other participants of the new group.
At the end we will randomly choose one of the questions and use your answer to that
question to determine your payment for this stage of the experiment.
Screens 12-15: Instructions for Stage 219
Recall that your score is XX, there are 10 possible scores: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9, and a
higher score indicates a larger departure from the true ranking.
Please choose your preferred option.
(a) You will receive $4 if your score is in the top Y%. This means that your score is
HIGHER than at least (100-Y)% of the scores of the participants other.
(b) You will participate in a computer generated lottery that will award you $4 with
probability 50% and $0 with a probability of 50%.
18Note that although we enumerated all 10 possible scores in the instructions presented to both the control and
score treatment, it was erroneously indicated that the possible scores are 9.
19We presented successive screens, where Y would take the value of 10, 20 and 30 and we either had top Y % or
bottom Y %.
23Experimental Instructions for Receivers
Screen 1: Log in
Screen 2: General Information
You are taking part in an economics experiment, the purpose of which is to examine the
decisions people make in certain circumstances. You will be paid a participation fee of $3
for completing the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to earn additional money.
The money that you earn will be paid to you in cash. In particular, after all participants
have completed the experiment you will receive an email from us with instructions regarding
the specic times and the location at Higheld Campus to pick up your money from. Note
that an assistant will pay you privately.
Screen 3: Consent Form
Screen 4: Instructions
In this experiment you will play a game with up to 15 other participants. You will be
called player B and each other participant you are matched with will be called player A.
The roles have been randomly allocated. You will not know with whom you were matched,
neither now nor after the experiment, and we will not reveal your identity to the participants
you are matched with either.
There are 6 outcomes, and each outcome species a payo for you and one for each
player A that you are matched with. Each player A has seen the payos associated with
each outcome and has ranked the outcomes from 1 to 6.
Then, you will see a message of the following form.
\Player A has ranked the 6 outcomes, in terms of your payo, from highest to lowest.
Please choose a number between 1 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
highest according to your payo) and 6 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
lowest according to your payo)."
Your choice will determine the payos for you and for each player A that you are matched
with. Your payment will be determined as follows: in the end we will randomly choose one
of the player As you are matched with and use their ranking and your choice of outcome
to determine your payo. For example, if you choose number 1, you will get the payment
associated with the outcome ranked rst by the randomly chosen player A. If you choose
number 4, you will get the payment associated with the outcome ranked fourth by the
randomly chosen player A.
You will never know what amounts were actually oered in the options not chosen.
Furthermore, you will never know the amount that each player A has earned in the chosen
option or would have earned in any of the other options not chosen by you.
Because the information conveyed to you by the message of each player A is identical,
you will only see one message and your choice will be applied to the rankings of all player
24As.
Screen 5: Choice
Player A has ranked the 6 outcomes, in terms of your payo, from highest to lowest.
Please choose a number between 1 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
highest according to your payo) and 6 (representing the outcome that player A has ranked
lowest according to your payo).
25